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  1 
1 Introduction 
In recent years there have been significant improvements in understanding and measuring 
concentration risk in credit portfolios such as undiversified idiosyncratic risk and industry or 
country risk. The measurement of these risks is important against the background of regulato-
ry capital needs as well as for computing the economic capital. Unfortunately, the existing 
approaches are mostly not fully consistent with the new capital adequacy framework (Basel 
II) – sometimes within the derivation and sometimes within the implementation – so that the 
benefit of these approaches is restricted. Furthermore, comparative analyses on these models 
are scarce. Against this background we address the following questions: 
  How can the existing approaches be modified and adjusted to be consistent with the 
Basel framework? Is the risk measure Value at Risk problematic when dealing with 
concentration risk? 
  Which methods are capable to measure concentration risk and how good do they per-
form in comparison? What are the advantages and disadvantages of these methods? 
For answering these questions, we firstly investigate the assumptions underlying the Basel 
framework. The Basel II formula for measuring the Value at Risk of credit portfolios is based 
on the so-called asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) framework as explained in Gordy 
(2003). In this framework it is assumed that 
  the portfolio is infinitely fine grained and thus it consists of a nearly infinite number 
of credits with small exposures, and 
  only one systematic risk factor influences the default risk of all loans in the portfolio. 
The first assumption implies that there are no name concentrations within the portfolio, thus 
all idiosyncratic risk is diversified completely. The second assumption implicates that there 
are no sector concentrations such as industry- or country-specific risk concentrations. These 
are idealizations that can be problematic for real world portfolios.  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) already recognized the high im-
portance of credit risk concentrations in the Basel framework: “Risk concentrations are argu-
ably the single most important cause of major problems in banks.”
1 Since it is difficult to in-
corporate credit risk concentrations in analytic approaches, in Basel II there is no quantitative 
approach mentioned how to deal with risk concentrations. Instead, it is only qualitatively de-
manded in Pillar 2 of Basel II that “Banks should have in place effective internal policies, sys-
                                                 
1 See BCBS (2005) §770.  2 
tems and controls to identify, measure, monitor, and control their credit risk concentrations.”
2 
Thus, it is each bank’s task how to meet these requirements concretely. But of course the 
measurement and management of risk concentrations are not only important for the determi-
nation of regulatory capital but also for the measurement of the “true” portfolio risk. The capi-
tal needs regarding this “true” risk will be denoted as economic capital in the following. 
When measuring concentration risk it is important to notice the different interpretation of 
concentration risk by banks and supervisors. Banks often only look at the one side of concen-
tration risk – the diversification effect. They often argue that the Pillar 1 capital requirement 
does not measure benefits from diversification. Therefore it is argued that this framework is 
the non-diversified benchmark and thus an upper barrier for the true capital requirement. Con-
trary, supervisors interpret concentration risk as “a positive or negative deviation from Pillar 1 
minimum capital requirements derived by a framework that does not account explicitly for 
concentration risk.” 
3 The latter perception is justified by the fact that the Pillar 1 capital rules 
were calibrated on well-diversified portfolios with low name and low sector concentration 
risk.
4 Thus, if a portfolio is low diversified, the risk will be underestimated when using the 
Basel formula. Therefore, additional capital is required to capture these types of concentration 
risk. Contrary, if the portfolio is very high diversified, the Basel formula can overestimate the 
“true” risk.
 However, in the case of this overestimation of risk it is not allowed – at least at 
present – to reduce the regulatory capital. For well-diversified portfolios the Basel formula is 
a good approximation of the “true” risk. This relation is highlighted in Figure 1. 
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
Name concentrations as well as sector concentrations are already analyzed in the litera-
ture. The theoretical derivation of the so-called granularity adjustment that accounts for name 
concentrations was done by Wilde (2001) and improved by Pykhtin and Dev (2002) and Gor-
                                                 
2 See BCBS (2005) §773. Furthermore, because of the importance of this topic for the stability of the banking 
system, the Basel Committee launched the “Research Task Force Concentration Risk” that presented its final re-
port in BCBS (2006). The Task Force collected information about the state of the art in current practice and aca-
demic literature, analyzed the impact of departures from the ASRF model and reviewed some methodologies to 
measure name and sector concentrations. An additional workstream focused on stress testing against the back-
ground of risk concentrations. 
3 See BCBS (2006). 
4 See BCBS (2006) and CEBS (2006) §18.  3 
dy (2003). This can be called “portfolio name concentration” because the approach refers to 
the finite number of credits in the portfolio. The adjustment formulas are derived in a more 
straightforward approach by Martin and Wilde (2002), Rau-Bredow (2002) and Gordy 
(2004). Furthermore, the adjustment is extended and numerically analyzed in detail by 
Gürtler, Heithecker, and Hibbeln (2008). An approach related to Wilde (2001) is the granular-
ity adjustment from Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2007). In contrast, the semi-asymptotic ap-
proach from Emmer and Tasche (2005) refers to name concentrations due to a single name 
while the rest of the portfolio remains infinitely granular. Thus, this type can be called “single 
name concentration”. 
There also exist analytic and semi-analytic approaches that account for sector concentra-
tions. One rigorous analytical approach is Pykhtin (2004) that is based on a similar principle 
as in Martin and Wilde (2002). An alternative is the semi-analytic model from Cespedes et al. 
(2006) that derives an approximation formula through a complex numerical mapping proce-
dure. Another approach from Düllmann (2006) extends the binomial extension technique 
(BET) model from Moody’s. Tasche (2006) suggests an ASRF-extension in an asymptotic 
multi-factor setting. Some numerical work on the performance of the Pykhtin model is done 
by Düllmann and Masschelein (2007). Furthermore, Düllmann (2007) presents a first compar-
ison of different approaches on sector concentration risk. The problem is that the derivation 
and the application of the approaches are often inconsistent with the Basel II framework what 
is critical for the following reasons: 
  Banks are demanded to measure concentration risks and “explicitly consider the ex-
tent of their credit risk concentrations in their assessment of capital adequacy under 
Pillar 2” of Basel II. Even if a bank uses a high-sophisticated multi-factor model, the 
results are not comparable with the Pillar 1 capital requirement if the results are not 
consistent to the Basel framework. Thus, it remains unclear if or how much additional 
regulatory capital is needed regarding risk concentrations. 
  Generally, it is not worthwhile to have a major gap between the regulatory and the 
“true” economic capital. A homogenization of these values is one goal of the new 
Capital Accord and would simplify the management of the credit portfolio. 
For these reasons we demonstrate how multi-factor models can be used in a way that is con-
sistent with the Basel II framework. This can be seen as expanding the validity of the Basel 
formula from the inner region of Figure 1 to the whole region. As sector concentrations typi- 4 
cally have a significantly higher impact on the capital requirement than name concentrations,
5 
we focus on sector concentrations in the following. Furthermore we compare the capability of 
different multi-factor approaches in approximating the “true” portfolio risk through a simula-
tion study. In this context we also use our framework to test whether the problems mentioned 
in the literature with the widespread used VaR are relevant in connection with the measure-
ment of concentration risk. The use of the VaR is usually criticized since this risk measure 
does not fulfill all axioms of coherency.
6 Instead, the application of the coherent risk measure 
Expected Shortfall (ES) is suggested. Since the non-coherency of the VaR is typically illu-
strated in contrived portfolio examples the relevance of this issue should be analyzed in more 
realistic settings.  
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the ASRF 
framework and the Basel formula. Moreover, we discuss the problems of the non-coherent 
Value at Risk in the context of concentration risk and present how the coherent ES can be 
used consistent with Basel II. In section 3 we introduce multi-factor models in general, and 
the Pykhtin as well as the Cespedes model in particular. In this context we demonstrate how 
these approaches could be modified and applied to achieve meaningful results. We compare 
the performance of the models with a simulation study in section 4. Furthermore, we test the 
accuracy of the VaR in comparison to the ES. The paper concludes with section 5. 
 
2  Coherent Concentration Risk Measurement in the Context of the 
Basel Framework 
2.1  The ASRF Framework and the Basel II Formula 
As mentioned before, the Basel II risk quantification formula is based upon the ASRF frame-
work that assumes an infinitely granular portfolio and the existence of only one systematic 
risk factor x  . If these two assumptions are fulfilled the relative portfolio loss L   in t = T al-
most surely equals the expected loss (EL) conditional on the realization of the systematic fac-
tor x 
7 
                                                 
5 See BCBS (2006). 
6 See Artzner et al. (1999). 
7 To keep track of the model, stochastic variables are marked with a tilde “~”. Further, “E” denotes the expecta-
tion operator.  5 
   LE L | x 0      a.s.
8 (1) 
If the loss given default (LGD) is assumed to be deterministic, the conditional expectation can 
be written as 
      
nn
i i Default,i i i Default,i
i1 i1
E L|x E w L G D I |x w L G D E I |x
  
 º º   º º ∑∑    , (2) 
where  Default I   represents the indicator function that is 1 in the event of default and 0 in case of 
survival of the obligor, n stands for the number of credits, and wi denotes the weight of credit 
i in the credit portfolio (i ± {1, …, n}). For the concrete application of formula (2), the condi-
tional default expectation has to be determined. In the Basel II framework, the well known 
Vasicek model is used.
9 In this one-period one-factor model the return of each obligor is dri-
ven by two components that realize at a future point in time T: a systematic part x   that influ-
ences all firms and a firm-specific (idiosyncratic) part  i H  . Thus, the “normalized” asset re-
turns
10  i a   of each obligor i in t = T can be represented by the following model 
  ii i i ax 1   U º  U ºH   , (3) 
in which x~N ( 0 , 1 )   and  i ~N ( 0 , 1 ) H   are independently and identically normally distributed 
with mean zero and standard deviation one. In this model, the correlation structure of each 
firm i is represented by the firm-specific correlation  i U  to the common factor. Hence, the 
correlation between two firms i, j can be expressed as  ij U º U  or simply as U for the case of 
a homogeneous correlation structure. 
Further, the probability of default of each obligor is exogenously given as PDi.
11 Corres-
ponding to formula (3), an obligor i defaults at t = T when its “normalized” return falls below 
a default threshold bi which can be characterized by 
  ii i i ii ab x1 b . ¾ U º  U ºH     (4) 
Against this background the threshold bi is determined by the exogenous specification of 
PDi:
12  
                                                 
8 See Gordy (2003). 
9 See e.g. Vasicek (1987, 1991, 2002) and Finger (1999, 2001). 
10 The returns are normalized by subtracting the expected return and dividing the resulting term by the standard 
deviation in order to get standard normally distributed variables. 
11 The probability of default could either be determined by the institution itself or by a rating agency.  6 
  
1
ii i i i i PD prob a b N(b ) b N (PD )     ¾    . (5) 
Conditional on a realization of the systematic factor the probability of default of each obligor 
is 
    ii
1
ii
ii a b i
i
N( P D ) x
prob a b | x E I | x N :p (x)
1


⎛⎞ U º
      ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ U ⎝⎠

     . (6) 
Applying formula (6) from the Vasicek model to formula (2) from the ASRF framework, the 
portfolio loss distribution can be computed. For quantification of the credit risk, the Value at 
Risk (VaR) on confidence level z can be used, that is the z-quantile qz of the loss variable, in 
which z ± (0,1) is the target solvency probability. Precisely, like Gordy (2004), we define the 
VaR as the loss that is only exceeded with the probability of at most 1–z, i.e. 
       zz VaR L : q L : inf l: prob L l z        . (7) 
In the context of the ASRF framework, the VaR can be computed similarly to formula (1) as 
     z1 z VaR L E L| x q (x) 0        a.s.,  (8) 
where  z q( x )   stands for the z-quantile of the systematic factor. Recalling formula (2), (6), and 
the normality of the systematic factor, the VaR of the portfolio equals 
 
 
n
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ii
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 (9) 
if we insert the confidence level z = 0.999. This is the (well established) VaR formula used in 
Basel II. Obviously, the credit risk only relies on the systematic factor since due to the infinite 
number of exposures the idiosyncratic risks associated with each individual obligor cancel out 
each other and are diversified completely.  
 
2.2  Concentration Risk and Coherency 
In recent years there has been an extensive discussion about reasonable risk measures. Artzner 
et al. (1999) formulated four axioms that a risk measure should satisfy to be coherent: transla-
tion invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and monotonicity. Unfortunately, the 
commonly used VaR is not coherent because it is not necessarily subadditive. As long as we 
                                                                                                                                                          
12 The term prob(A) stands for the probability of the occurrence of an uncertain event A.  N() º  characterizes the 
cumulative standard normal distribution and N
1() º  stands for the inverse of  N() º .  7 
stay in the ASRF framework this characteristic is not problematic because in this context the 
VaR is exactly additive.
13 But if we leave the ASRF framework, this behavior is not guaran-
teed anymore. This is true for non-asymptotic portfolios as well as for multi-factor models. 
However, many contributions that deal with concentration risk in the context of the Basel II 
framework use the VaR to quantify credit risk without calling the risk measure into question 
(possibly to be consistent with the ASRF-framework) even if the subadditivity could get prob-
lematic if concentration risk is considered.
14 Thus, it could be beneficial to change the meas-
ure of risk, e.g. to use the coherent Expected Shortfall, that is defined as
15 
      
z
1
zz z (L q ) ES L (1 z) E L I q 1 z prob L q

 ⎡ ⎤   º º º   ⎣ ⎦      (10) 
with qz for the VaR on confidence level z (see formula (7)), or simply as 
     
z
1
zz (L q ) ES L (1 z) E L I E L|L q

 ⎡⎤   º º    ⎣⎦       (11) 
for continuous distributions. In addition to the mentioned coherency, the ES is also beneficial 
from an economic perspective. Instead of focusing on a single quantile which provides no in-
formation about tail events, the ES incorporates also information about the degree of losses in 
the case that the VaR is exceeded. This information is not only relevant for bondholders but 
also from a regulatory perspective as the shortfall amount could be required to recover the 
bank. 
But despite of the mentioned disadvantages of the VaR, it is still widespread used in prac-
tice, so there might be some opposing arguments. One point could be that the mentioned 
problems of the VaR do not appear in realistic settings and thus both the ES and the VaR lead 
to plausible results if applied accurately. As this issue is analyzed insufficiently for concentra-
tion risk in credit portfolios, we will take up this subject in our simulations later on.
16 A fur-
ther often stated issue is that the ES is much less robust than the VaR.
17 But as shown in 
                                                 
13 This can be seen in formula (8) considering that the expectation operator is additive. 
14 See e.g. Heitfield, Burton, and Chomsisengphet (2006), Cespedes et al. (2006), Düllmann (2006), as well as 
Düllmann and Masschelein (2007). 
15 See Acerbi and Tasche (2002). 
16 Some of our analyses regarding name concentrations show that the corresponding granularity adjustment for-
mulas lead to better results if the ES is used instead of the VaR, particularly if there is a high degree of concen-
tration risk. A numerical study can be requested from the authors. However, it is unclear if this is true for sector 
concentrations, too. 
17 The standard argument is reproduced by Acerbi (2004) as follows: “VaR does not even try to estimate the 
leftmost tail events, it simply neglects them altogether, and therefore it is not affected by the statistical uncer-
tainty of rare events. ES on the contrary, being a function of rare events also, has a much larger statistical error.”  8 
Acerbi (2004), VaR and ES usually have similar statistical errors, implying this aspect not to 
be an argument against the use of the ES.
18 An additional problem is that the measured eco-
nomic capital would be significantly higher if it is determined on the basis of the ES instead 
of the VaR (by use of the same confidence level). If we exemplary examine a portfolio with 
PD = 0.5%  and  ρ  =  20% in the ASRF framework, the measured risk on confidence level 
z = 99.9% is 9.1% for the VaR and 11.81% for the ES, what is not the intended consequence 
of changing the risk measure. Instead, we would only like to have the appreciated properties 
when measuring concentration risk without to be bound to increase the required amount of 
capital. Therefore, we will show how the confidence level can be adjusted to account for this 
aspect subsequently. 
To sum up, from a theoretical perspective it is reasonable to use a coherent risk measure 
like the ES instead of the VaR when we allow for concentrated credit portfolios. Therefore, 
we show how the ES can be applied consistently to the Basel II framework in the next section. 
But as we do not know whether the mentioned disadvantages of the VaR appear in realistic 
settings of concentrated portfolios, we also apply the VaR during our simulations in chapter 4 
and analyze whether and in which degree, respectively, the usage of VaR leads to undesirable 
results. 
 
2.3  Adjusting for Coherency in Concentrated Portfolios 
Against the background of the preceding section we want to implement the ES and compare 
the outcome with the results by application of the VaR. But if we change the risk measure we 
have to ensure that the new risk measure (the ES) on the one hand is consistent with the 
framework presented in Pillar 2 of Basel II to get meaningful results for additional capital re-
quirements stemming from concentration risk. On the other hand the new risk measure should 
still match the capital requirements of Pillar 1 if the portfolio under consideration fulfills the 
assumptions of the ASRF framework. I.e. in the context of the ASRF framework, the capital 
requirements should not differ whether the risk is measured by the VaR or by the ES. There-
fore, we examine VaR
Basel on the given confidence level z = 99.9% for several (infinitely gra-
nular) bank portfolios of different quality. As a next step we determine the confidence level of 
the ES that is necessary to match the results for both risk measures. We define this ES-
confidence level z (= z(ES)) implicitly as 
                                                 
18 Actually, due to the lower comparable confidence level – which will be explained in section 2.3 – the statisti-
cal error of the ES is smaller compared to the VaR.  9 
    Basel Basel
z ES L VaR L    , (12) 
with 
Basel VaR  given by formula (9). 
Basel
z ES  can be calculated using formula (11) and (9), 
leading to 
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 º  U
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where  2 N( ) º  stands for the bivariate cumulative normal distribution.
19 
Firstly, we investigate the extreme cases that all creditors of a bank have a rating of (I) 
AAA or (VII) CCC.
20 As can be seen in Table 1, the ES-confidence level must be in a range 
between 99.67% and 99.74%. Using these confidence levels the required capital is almost 
identical regardless of whether VaR or ES is used.  
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
Additionally, we use five portfolios with different credit quality distributions (very high, high, 
average, low, and very low) that are visualized in Figure 2.
21 All resulting confidence levels 
are between 99.71% and 99.73% with mean 99.72%. Even if there is some interconnection 
between the confidence level and the portfolio quality, an ES-confidence level of z = 99.72% 
seems to be accurate for most real world portfolios. 
 
- Figure 2 about here - 
 
3  Basel II-consistent Credit Risk Modeling in a Multi-Factor Setting 
3.1  Multi-Factor Models in Credit Risk Modeling 
To obtain a more realistic modeling of correlated defaults in a credit portfolio, we will intro-
duce a typical multi-factor model. In such a model the dependence structure between obligors 
is not driven by one global systematic risk factor but by sector specific risk factors. Addition-
ally, the group of obligors is divided into S sectors. Hereby a suitable sector assignment is 
                                                 
19 Cf. Acerbi and Tasche (2002) and Pykhtin (2004). 
20 We used the idealized default rates from Standard & Poors, see Brand and Bahar (2001), ranging from 0.01% 
to 18.27%, but the results do not differ widely for different values. 
21 The portfolios with high, average, low, and very low quality are taken from Gordy (2000). We added a portfo-
lio with very high quality.  10 
important,
22 i.e. asset correlations shall be high within a sector and low between different sec-
tors. In contrast to the single factor model in which the correlation structure of each firm i is 
completely described by U , in a multi-factor model we distinguish between an inter-sector 
correlation  Inter U  and an intra-sector correlation  Intra U . The inter-sector correlation describes 
the correlation between the sector factors and the intra-sector correlation characterizes the 
sensitivity of the asset return to the corresponding sector factor. Thus, the asset return of obli-
gor i in sector s can be represented by 
  s,i Intra,i s Intra,i i ax 1   U º U º[    , (14) 
where  s x   is the sector risk factor and  i [   stands for the idiosyncratic factor.  s x   and  i [   are 
normally distributed variables with mean zero and standard deviation one that are independent 
among each other. Since the sector risk factors  s x   are potentially dependent random variables 
that are difficult to deal with
23 we make use of the possibility to present the sector risk factors 
as a combination of independently and standard normally distributed factors  k z   (k = 1, …, K) 
 
KK
2
s ss , k k s , k
k1 k1
xz w i t h 1
  
 D º D   ∑∑  , (15) 
in which the factor weights  s,k D  are calculated via a Cholesky decomposition of the inter-
sector correlation matrix.
24 Hence the inter-sector correlation is given as  
 
K
Inter
s,t s,k t,k
k1  
U  D º D ∑ . (16) 
From (14) and (15) the asset correlation between two obligors is given by 
 
Intra,i Intra,j
K s,i t,j
Intra,i Intra,j s,k t,k
k1
,i f   s t ,
corr(a ,a )
,i f   s t .
 
⎧ U º U  
⎪
  ⎨
U º U ºD º D  ⎪
⎩ ∑
  (17) 
                                                 
22 As shown by Morinaga and Shiina (2005) an assignment of borrowers to the wrong sectors leads to a higher 
estimation error than a non-optimal sector definition. 
23 Concretely, the independence of the risk factors is essential for the derivation of the Pykhtin-model in section 
3.3. 
24 This approach is a common mathematical method to generate correlated normal random variables and leads to 
the identical number of independent risk factors  k z   and dependent sector factors  s x  , that is K equals S. Another 
common method to determine independent risk factors is the principal component analysis which leads to a re-
duced number of risk factors.  11 
Obligors in the same sector will be highly correlated with one another when their intra-sector 
correlation is high. The correlation of obligors in different sectors also depends on the factor 
weights, which are derived from the inter-sector correlation. Consequently, the dependence 
structure in the multi-factor model is completely described by the intra- and inter-sector corre-
lations. Taking formula (5) into account, the portfolio loss distribution can be written as 
 
s
1
s,i s,i
n S
s,i s,i aN ( P D )
s1i1
Lw L G D I ,  
  
 º º ∑∑ 
  (18) 
where  s n  is the number of obligors in sector s. 
In the next three subsections we will present different approaches to determine the distri-
bution and tail expectations of L  . Furthermore, we will demonstrate how the models can be 
parameterized to be Basel II-consistent. 
 
3.2 Monte-Carlo-Simulations  and  Parameterization through a Cor-
relation Matching Procedure 
A common approach to estimate the portfolio loss distribution is the use of Monte-Carlo-
Simulations. In each simulation run the sector factors as well as the idiosyncratic factor of 
each obligor are randomly generated. Herewith the asset return is calculated according to (14). 
If  s,i a   is less than a threshold given by 
1
s,i N( P D)
 , obligor i defaults. The portfolio loss is de-
termined from formula (18) by summing up the exposure weights  s,i w  multiplied by the 
s,i LGD  of each defaulted credit. To get a good approximation of the “true” loss distribution 
we choose 500,000 runs for our Monte-Carlo-Simulations. After running the simulation and 
sorting loss outcomes, we get the portfolio loss distribution. To obtain the ES for a given con-
fidence level z, in principle the mean for all loss realizations equal or greater than  z q  has to 
be calculated. The quantile  z q  is given by the z 500,000th º  element of the simulated distribu-
tion.
25 
To calibrate the multi-factor model, most variables can be chosen identically to the single 
factor model. The only difference is the correlation structure that generally consists of inter- 
and intra-sector correlations as described above. The matrix of inter-sector correlations is 
usually derived from historical default rates or from equity correlations between industry sec-
tors. The intra-sector correlations can be derived from historical default rates, too. The prob-
                                                 
25 The exact formulation is given in formula (10).  12 
lem of a derivation based on historical default rates is that there are not always enough obser-
vations to get stable results. That is even more problematic if it is assumed (like in Basel II) 
that the correlation and the PD are interdependent. Furthermore, the results from the multi-
factor model would normally not be consistent with Basel II because the correlation structure 
is completely different. Thus, it would not be possible to identify if there is need for addition-
al regulatory capital under Pillar 2 (measured consistently to Pillar 1) of Basel II.  
For both reasons the intra-sector correlations could be chosen analogously to the Basel II 
formula 
 
50 PD 50 PD
Basel 50 50
1e 1e
0,12 0,24 1
1e 1e
º º

⎛⎞ 
U  º  º  ⎜⎟  ⎝⎠
 (19) 
for corporates. This is what Cespedes et al. (2006) did in their analyses. But their approach is 
critical for the following reason: The validity of this formula for the intra-sector correlations 
is equivalent to the statement that the regulatory capital calculated via the formula of Pillar 1 
is an upper barrier of the true risk. This property in turn is only fulfilled if there exists only 
one sector or if all sectors are perfectly correlated. In all other cases there is an effect of sector 
diversification that leads to a lower capital requirement compared to the Basel framework. 
Beyond, the Basel II correlation formula is not intended by the Basel committee to reflect the 
intra-sector correlation exclusively. Instead, the framework is calibrated on well-diversified 
portfolios, as demonstrated in Figure 1, implying that the correlation formula is chosen in a 
way that the single factor model leads to a good approximation of the “true” risk based on the 
full correlation structure in a multi-factor model. Cespedes et al. (2006) already recognized 
this criticism and mentioned that it should be possible to use some scaling up for the intra-
sector correlations and the resulting capital, respectively, but their calculations are based on 
the formula above. 
Alternatively, the intra-sector correlation could be chosen in a way that the regulatory 
capital RC can be matched with the economic capital 
mf EC  that is simulated for a well-
diversified portfolio within a multi-factor model. Therefore, we define the “implicit intra-
sector correlation” 
(Implied)
Intra ρ  by 
   
mf (Implied)
Inter Intra Basel EC , RC UU   U . (20) 
Unfortunately, the portfolios for which the calibration was done by the Basel Committee in-
cluding the assumed inter-sector correlation structure are not publicly available. Thus, firstly 
we have to choose a concrete inter-sector correlation and determine the implicit intra-sector 
correlation for some hypothetical, well-diversified portfolios via Monte-Carlo-Simulations  13 
with several parameter trials. This approach is related to Lopez (2004), who empirically de-
termines the single correlation parameter for the ASRF model that leads to the same 99.9% 
quantile as KMV’s multi-factor model for several portfolio types (geographical region, PD, 
and asset size categories) using a grid search procedure. Thus, in the approach of Lopez 
(2004) the left-hand side of formula (20) is given and the single correlation parameter of the 
right-hand side is determined, whereas we are searching for the intra-sector correlation on the 
left-hand side that leads to a match of both models when the other parameters, especially the 
single correlation parameter of Basel II, are exogenously given. 
As mentioned above, the required inter-sector correlation matrix could be estimated from 
historical default rates or from time series of stock returns.
26 Düllmann, Küll, and Kunisch 
(2008) demonstrate on the basis of an extensive simulation study that it is recommendable to 
use stock prices instead of historical default rates as this involves smaller statistical errors. 
Against this background we rely on equity correlations, too, and use the correlation matrix of 
the MSCI EMU industry indices computed by Düllmann and Masschelein (2007) for the in-
ter-sector correlation structure (see Table 2).
27  
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Our definition of a well-diversified portfolio is based on the overall sector concentration of 
the German banking system.
28 Even if it is theoretically possible to achieve lower capital re-
quirements through different sector decomposition, this can only be done by a restricted num-
ber of banks since a deviation from the market structure of all banks immediately leads to a 
disequilibrium. The composition can be seen in Table 3. In addition, the total number of cre-
dits is assumed to be n = 5000 to guarantee a low degree of name concentration. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
                                                 
26 An overview of the literature regarding the measurement of asset correlation parameters can be found in 
Düllmann, Küll, and Kunisch (2008) and Grundke (2008). 
27 The correlation structure based on the MSCI US is similar, see Düllmann and Masschelein (2007). 
28 Düllmann and Masschelein (2007) notice that the concentration is very similar to other countries like France, 
Belgium and Spain.  14 
If we assume a constant intra-sector correlation, the best match is achieved by (approximate-
ly) 
(Implied)
Intra ρ  = 25%.
29 The concrete results, however, vary with the portfolio quality (see Table 
4).
30 Thus, the use of a constant intra-sector correlation can lead to a significant underestima-
tion of economic capital for high-quality portfolios and to an overestimation for low-quality 
portfolios. 
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
To reduce the deviation, the intra-sector correlation should be decreasing in PD. We found 
that the following intra-sector correlation function leads to a good match for portfolios with 
different quality distributions: 
 
50 PD 50 PD
(Implied)
Intra 50 50
1e 1e
ρ 0.185 0.34 1
1e 1e
º º

⎛⎞ 
 º  º  ⎜⎟  ⎝⎠
 (21) 
Thus, we use the correlation function type from Basel II but the correlation range is from 
18.5% to 34% instead of 12% to 24%.
31 It has to be noted that this formula is still a substan-
tial simplification as we assume that the intra-sector correlation is PD-dependent only. In ad-
dition, empirically there are also inter-sectoral differences of this parameter.
32 In principle it 
would be possible to capture both effects, e.g. by multiplying a sector-specific factor to for-
mula (21), which covers the relation of the empirically observed correlations.
33 Of course, the 
absolute level of the resulting correlations would usually be different from the empirical ob-
servations to keep Basel II consistent results. But for convenience we rely on the PD-
dependent formula (21) in our following analyses. 
                                                 
29 This value results on the basis of both measures (VaR and ES) on the respective confidence level as described 
in section 2.3. The result is consistent with Düllmann and Masschelein (2007) who use a constant intra-sector 
correlation of 25% in their analysis. 
30 See Figure 4 for the portfolio characteristics. 
31 We tried several different functional forms but the formula above performed best. The multipliers 18.5% and 
34% in function (21) were determined with a grid search using a reasonable parameter range, which is similar to 
the procedure of Lopez (2004) used for the single correlation parameter. 
32 E.g. Heitfield, Burton, and Chomsisengphet (2006) determine the sector loadings, which equal  Intra U  for 50 
industry sectors using KMV data on asset values. The resulting intra-sector correlation is on average 18.8% and 
the standard deviation is 8.3%. These inter-sectoral differences are not captured by the formula above. 
33 A correlation structure with one degree of freedom for every PD-/sector-combination is practically unfeasible 
due to high data requirements.  15 
Thus, all additional input data needed for typical multi-factor models, e.g. using Monte- 
Carlo-Simulations, are given with Table 2 and formula (21). Using these values, the multi-
factor models should be consistent with the Basel framework. Consequently, the measured 
economic capital is only lower than the regulatory capital if the portfolio is less concentrated 
than a typical, well-diversified portfolio and the needed economic capital will be above the 
capital requirement of the regulatory framework if there is more concentration risk in the cre-
dit portfolio. 
 
3.3  Implementation for the Pykhtin-Model 
In this section we present the multi-factor adjustment of Pykhtin (2004). It is an extension of 
the granularity adjustment, introduced by Gordy (2003), Wilde (2001) and Martin and Wilde 
(2002), for multi-factor models and provides an analytical method for calculating the VaR and 
ES of a credit portfolio. 
The basic idea of Pykhtin is to approximate the portfolio loss L   in the multi-factor model 
with the respective portfolio loss L   in an accurately adjusted ASRF-model. This is done by 
mapping the correlation structure of each credit in the multi-factor model into a single correla-
tion factor. This factor is determined by maximizing the correlation between the new single 
risk factor x   and the original sector factors { s x  }. 
Via this approach it is possible
34 to approximate the z-quantile  z q( L )   of the portfolio loss 
by a quadratic Taylor series around the ASRF solution. This leads to 
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where H is the scale of perturbation and U   describes the approximation error between L   and 
L  , i.e. ULL     . The first summand on the right-hand side of (22) is the z-quantile of the 
loss L   within the reasonable adjusted ASRF-model. The corresponding distribution of L   can 
be calculated by 
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where  i c  is the correlation between the systematic risk factor x   and the asset return.
35 
                                                 
34 See Martin and Wilde (2002).  16 
Instead of using U  as it is done in the ASRF-model, the new correlation parameter  i c i s  
used to match the correlation structure in the multi-factor model. As shown in formula (9), the 
loss quantile  z q( L )   is given by 
1 l(N (1 z))
   in the ASRF-model. In addition, it can be shown 
that the first derivative in formula (22) is equal to zero. Hence, the so-called multi-factor ad-
justment  z q '  is completely described by the second derivative in formula (22). According to 
Pykhtin (2004) and Wilde (2001)  z q '  can be written as 
 
1
zz z
xN ( 1z )
1l ( x )
q q (L) q (L) v (x) v(x) x ,
2l ( x ) l ( x )   
⎡⎤  ⎛⎞
 '    º º ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟  º ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
   (24) 
in which l(x)   and l( x )   are the first and second derivative of l according to formula (23) and 
v(x) is the conditional variance of U. Further, v(x) can be decomposed into two terms, 
v( x )   and  GA v (x). The first term v( x )   describes the systematic risk adjustment, which is 
given by the difference between the multi-factor and single-factor loss distribution in infinite-
ly granular portfolios. The second term  GA v (x) is the granularity adjustment, which measures 
the influence of single-name concentration.
36 Using these terms the multi-factor adjustment 
can be presented as  
 
GA
zzz qqq ,
 '  ' '  (25) 
i.e. the multi-factor adjustment can be split into a systematic risk adjustment component and a 
granularity adjustment component. Finally, the approximation of a loss quantile  z q( L )   in (22) 
is given by (23) and the multi-factor adjustment: 
 
GA
zz z z q( L ) q( L ) q q
   '  '   . (26) 
After dealing with the VaR we now present the ES in a multi-factor model. In this context 
formula (11) can be rewritten as 
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. (27) 
                                                                                                                                                          
35 The derivation of ci to obtain the maximum correlation between x   and { s x  } can be found in Appendix A.1. 
From Appendix A.1 we also know that for determination of ci both (the intra- and inter-sector) correlations are 
needed, which can be taken from section 3.2. 
36 The derivatives and the conditional variances can be found in Appendix A.2.  17 
To get this result the quantile  z q( L )   is substituted by approximation (26). The first summand 
of the right-hand side describes the ES for the single factor portfolio and the second summand 
is the multi-factor adjustment. 
As shown by Pykhtin (2004)  z ES (L)   and  z ES (L) '   can be calculated as 
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and 
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 (29) 
with n() º  denoting the density function of the standard normal distribution. Again, the multi-
factor adjustment can be decomposed into a systematic and an idiosyncratic part by decom-
posing the conditional variance. Hence the ES for a portfolio in a multi-factor model is given 
by 
 
GA
zz z z ES (L) ES (L) ES ES .
   '  '    (30) 
In principle it is straightforward to implement the Pykhtin model. For calculating the ES we 
have to compute formula (29).
37 If applied to large portfolios, its computation can be extreme-
ly time-consuming since the calculation procedure inter alia requires n
2-times the computation 
of the conditional asset correlation,
38 with n being the number of credits. An alternative pro-
cedure performed by Düllmann and Masschelein (2007) is to neglect the multi-factor adjust-
ment and to use (23) only to aggregate all credits for each sector and thus using the formulas 
on sector and not on borrower level. To consider the multi-factor adjustment and thus to in-
crease the accuracy, we propose to built PD-classes for each of the sectors and aggregate the 
credits to these buckets for the calculation of the multi-factor adjustment. With this approach, 
the computation time is basically controlled by 
 
2
PD Sectors Loops (N S )  º , (31) 
where NPD and S denote the number of PD-classes and sectors.
39 If the number of PD-classes 
is sufficient high, the approximation error resulting from aggregating individual PDs to PD-
classes is negligible. As the number of loops will not grow with bigger portfolios, it is possi-
                                                 
37 For the implementation we need the derivatives and conditional variances given in Appendix A.2. 
38 The quadratic computation effort is due to the determination of a double sum (see Appendix A.2, (A.10)). 
39 The results of the multi-factor adjustment do not differ whether different exposures with the same PD are ag-
gregated or handled separately on borrower level. For details see Appendix A.2.  18 
ble to perform the adjustment on bucket level within reasonable time. Only the granularity ad-
justment should be calculated on borrower level but this is no computational burden.
40 
 
3.4  Implementation for the Cespedes-Model 
Cespedes et al. (2006) present a method to relate the economic capital in the multi-factor 
model to the regulatory capital via a diversification factor DF( ), which depends on two para-
meters:
41 
  the average sector concentration CDI and 
  the average weighted inter-sector correlation E. 
Herewith the economic capital of a portfolio can be approximated by: 
 
mf EC DF RC. º (32) 
Thus, the economic capital in the multi-factor model 
mf EC  can be approximated by a well-
defined diversification factor DF multiplied by the regulatory capital RC of the ASRF-model. 
As mentioned before, Cespedes et al. assume that the regulatory capital of Pillar 1 is an upper 
barrier of the true risk because no diversification effects between the sectors are considered, 
which in turn implies the parameter DF to be always less than or equal to one. In contrast, if 
we use our definition of the intra-sector correlation  Intra U  from section 3.2, it is possible to ob-
tain 
mf EC RC !  as well as 
mf EC RC   depending on the degree of diversification in compar-
ison to the well-diversified portfolio defined in section 3.2. Hence, our later on calculated DF-
function can be greater than one, i.e. the DF-function measures not only the benefit from sec-
tor diversification but also the risk resulting from high sector concentration. As the regulatory 
capital is additive in the ASRF-model (32) can be substituted by 
 
S
mf s
z
s1
EC DF RC
 
 º ∑ , (33) 
in which 
mf
z EC  is the economic capital in the multi-factor model and 
s RC  is the regulatory 
capital of sector s. In principle, the approach can be characterized as follows: Firstly, 
mf
z EC  is 
calculated for a multitude of portfolios via Monte-Carlo-Simulations. For each simulated port-
                                                 
40 The computation time when calculating the multi-factor adjustment on bucket- instead on borrower-level can 
be reduced from 67 minutes to 5 seconds for a portfolio with 11 sectors, 7 PD-classes, and 5000 creditors. 
41 In the strict sense Cespedes et al. relate the multi-factor model to the economic capital in a single-factor mod-
el. But since they apply the regulatory capital formula and we require a relation to this formula, too, we use the 
term regulatory capital instead.  19 
folio the diversification factor can be calculated according to formula (33). Finally, a regres-
sion is performed to get an approximation for DF as a function of the two parameters CDI and 
E. If DF can capture the industry diversification effects, we are able to approximate 
mf
z EC  
with formula (33) without additional Monte-Carlo-Simulations. 
To derive the parameters which explain the effect of diversification and concentration in a 
multi-factor model, Cespedes et al. suggest to use the average inter-sector correlation E. This 
can be interpreted as a scale of the dependence between the sectors. The formula for E is giv-
en as 
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 (34) 
The correlation is weighted by the expected shortfall in order to account for the contribution 
of each sector. The second suggested parameter is the capital diversification index denoted by 
CDI. It describes the sector concentration measured by the relative weight of each 
s RC :
42 
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The parameter CDI lies between the two extreme values:  
 
1
CDI
n
  , i.e. perfect sector diversification, 
  CDI 1   , i.e. perfect sector concentration. 
To avoid a too complex model Cespedes et al. neglect further potential input parameters to 
determine the DF-function. To approximate the multi-factor model, formula (33) can be re-
written as 
   
S
mf s
z
s1
EC CDI, DF CDI, RC .
 
E  Eº ∑  (36) 
In the following, we present the procedure to estimate the DF-function. To get a universally 
valid DF-factor as many portfolios as possible have to be generated and simulated. To reduce 
the necessary number of trials, the portfolios should be restricted to those with reasonable 
characteristics. Our portfolios are randomly generated using the following parameter setting. 
                                                 
42 This concentration measure is also known as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index.  20 
When we state several parameter values or a parameter range, the parameter is randomly 
drawn from this set. 
For the intra-sector correlations we use the functional form of formula (21). The inter-
sector correlation structure is taken from Table 2, so that all simulated portfolios are stem-
ming from this sector definition. Each portfolio consists of {2, …, 11} sectors that are ran-
domly drawn from the different industries. The sector weights are in [0, 1]. The total number 
of credits is 5000, equally divided for each sector. Each sector in turn consists of credits from 
the PD classes {AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC}. Instead of using equally distributed PD 
classes we draw the quality distribution from our predefined credit portfolio qualities {very 
high, high, average, low, very low} for every sector.
43 We draw 25,000 and 50,000 portfolios, 
respectively, and compute the economic capital in the multi-factor model for each portfolio.  
To determine the economic capital we tried both Monte-Carlo-Simulations with 100,000 
trials
44 for every portfolio and the Pykhtin formula from section 3.3. Because the computation 
time for Monte-Carlo-Simulations is materially longer, the corresponding results are based on 
25,000 random portfolios whereas we computed the economic capital for 50,000 portfolios 
when using the Pykhtin formula instead. Furthermore, since Cespedes et al. (2006) use the 
VaR as the relevant risk measure and thus define economic capital as 
mf mf EC VaR EL    we 
redefine the economic capital of the multi-factor model with respect to ES as argued in sec-
tion 2.3: 
mf mf EC ES EL   .
45 In contrast, for the regulatory capital we use 
Basel RC VaR EL   . The result could also be related to the Expected Shortfall in the ASRF-
model but we detected that the results differ only marginally and the VaR is easier to imple-
ment in typical spreadsheet applications.
46 The results for the diversification factor DF are 
very similar whether they are based on Monte-Carlo-Simulations or on the Pykhtin formula. 
Figure 3 presents characteristics of the diversification factor when using the Pykhtin formula. 
 
                                                 
43 The setting is similar to Cespedes et al. Until this point, the main difference is the definition of the intra- and 
inter-sector correlations. 
44 For the determination of the economic capital for one specific portfolio the number of trials is slightly low but 
as we perform 25,000 simulations and the simulation noise of each simulation is unsystematic, the error terms 
should cancel out each other to a large extent. 
45 We also tested the results when using the ES instead of the unexpected loss but the coefficient of determina-
tion is higher when subtracting the EL in the corresponding formulas when performing the simulations. 
46 To determine the Expected Shortfall with formula (13), a bivariate cumulative normal distribution has to be 
computed whereas the Value at Risk only makes use of univariate distributions.  21 
- Figure 3 about here - 
 
For determination of the functional form of DF we use a regression of the type
47 
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01 2 3 DF a a (1 CDI) (1 ) a (1 CDI) (1 ) a (1 CDI) (1 )   º º E  º º E  º º E (37) 
in both cases. The resulting function when using Monte-Carlo-Simulations is 
 
MC
22
DF 1.4626 1.4475 (1 CDI) (1 )
0.0382 (1 CDI) (1 ) 0.3289 (1 CDI) (1 )
     E
   E     E
 (38) 
with a coefficient of determination of R
2 = 95.5%. Analogously, we determined the DF-
function when using the Pykhtin formula 
 
Pykhtin
22
DF 1.4598 1.4168 (1 CDI) (1 )
0.0213 (1 CDI) (1 ) 0.2421 (1 CDI) (1 )
     E
   E     E
 (39) 
with R
2 = 97.9%. The latter function is plotted in Figure 4.
48 In order to get the approximation 
for the multi-factor model, formula (36) has to be computed using either function (38) or (39). 
 
- Figure 4 about here - 
 
It can be seen that the maximum diversification factor is about 1.46. Thus, in the case of (al-
most) no diversification effects the measured capital requirement is 46% above the regulatory 
capital under Pillar 1. This will appear in the case of being concentrated to a single sector, 
leading to CDI 1   , as well as in the theoretical case of perfect correlations between the rele-
vant sectors, leading to  1 E   . Furthermore, the diversification factor is strongly increasing in 
CDI and in E which is consistent with the intuition.  
 
                                                 
47 We tried several different regressions but similar to Cespedes et al. this function worked best. In contrast to 
Cespedes et al. we do not set the first parameter a0 to one because our DF-factor is not bound by the single-
factor-model. 
48 The shape of the function is similar to Cespedes et al. but their range is from 0.1 to 1.0 whereas our function 
ranges from 0.2 to 1.5. In addition, they received a little higher R
2 (99.4% instead of 95.5% and 97.9%, respec-
tively) but this is mainly due to the different simulation setting. Cespedes et al. directly draw the parameter  E  as 
an input parameter for each simulation, implying  E  to fully define their correlation structure. We use a hetero-
geneous correlation structure instead and compute  E  for the portfolios. Thus, in our setting  E  does not reflect 
the complete correlation structure which results in a lower R
2 but does not imply a worse approximation.  22 
4  Performance of the Concentration Risk Models 
4.1  Analysis for Deterministic Portfolios 
To determine the quality of the presented models, we start our analysis with calculating the 
risk for five deterministic portfolios of different quality.
49 We generate well-diversified port-
folios consisting of 5,000 credits. Consequently, we have neither high name nor high sector 
concentration risk. Concretely, we choose the sectors and their weights as given in Table 3. 
The inter-sector correlation is given in Table 2 whereas the intra-sector correlation is calcu-
lated on the basis of formula (21). The five portfolios differ in their PD distribution which is 
presented in Figure 4. Portfolio 1 is the portfolio with the highest and Portfolio 5 is the one 
with the lowest credit quality distribution.  
In Table 5 we compare the results from the Monte-Carlo-Simulation (MC-Sim.), the Ba-
sel II formula (Basel II), the Pykhtin model (Pykhtin), the Cespedes model calibrated with 
Monte-Carlo-Simulations (Cespedes I) and the Cespedes model calibrated with the Pykhtin 
formula (Cespedes II). As can be seen in the table, the benchmark portfolio is constructed in a 
way that the Basel II formula represents a very good approximation
50 of the “real” ES in a 
multi-factor model given by Monte Carlo Simulations.
51 Besides, the simulated VaR
mf 
matches the simulated ES
mf, our benchmark, almost exactly. The calculated values of the 
Pykhtin model are very good approximations of the ES in almost all cases, too. The outcomes 
of the Cespedes model are somewhat more imprecise in both cases. With better credit quality 
the estimation error is increasing, which leads to an underestimation of risk in high quality 
portfolios. 
 
- Table 5 about here - 
 
As a next step, we change the portfolio structure towards high sector concentration. There-
fore, we increase the sector weights of two sectors. We assume that 45% of the creditors – in 
terms of their exposure – belong to the Information Technology sector and an equal amount 
                                                 
49 The results refer to the total gross loss of a portfolio in terms of ES and VaR, respectively. To relate this to the 
unexpected net loss, the results have to be multiplied by the LGD and the EL has to be subtracted. 
50 The small mismatch is mainly due to keeping the ES-confidence level constant and not a result of the chosen 
intra-sector correlation function. If we directly compare the results from Monte-Carlo-Simulations with the ES in 
the ASRF-framework, the relative root mean squared error is reduced from 0.97% to 0.28%. 
51 In our analyses the number of simulation runs is 500,000.  23 
belongs to the Telecommunication Services sector. The remaining 10% of exposure are equal-
ly assigned to the miscellaneous sectors. As shown in Table 6 the risk materially increases for 
all types of portfolio quality. Again, the simulated values for ES
mf and VaR
mf are very close to 
each other. However, the Basel formula underestimates the risk by 14% to 20% depending on 
the portfolio quality. This is the (relative) amount that should be considered in the assessment 
of capital adequacy under Pillar 2. The approximation formula of Pykhtin can capture this 
concentration risk with a negligible error in all cases. Cespedes I leads to an underestimation 
of risk in high quality portfolios and to an overestimation of risk in low quality portfolios with 
a maximum deviation of nearly 4%. Contrary, Cespedes II underestimates the risk in most 
cases with up to 6%. Thus, the sector concentration risk is not fully captured for high quality 
portfolios. 
 
- Table 6 about here - 
 
Furthermore, we build credit portfolios with low sector concentration. For this purpose, we 
use the concept of naïve diversification implying each sector to have an equal weight of 1/11. 
As can be seen in Table 7, the economic capital is significantly lower than the regulatory 
capital. Moreover, this shows that it is easy to construct portfolios that are better diversified 
than the overall credit market.
52 Apart from insignificant deviations both simulated risk meas-
ures lead to the same solutions. Again the Pykhtin model approximates the “real” risk very 
good for all types of credit quality. The Cespedes model I underestimates the risk for high 
quality portfolios with up to 3%. The Cespedes model II underestimates the risk, too, but the 
approximation error is negligible. 
 
- Table 7 about here - 
 
4.2  Simulation Study for Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Portfo-
lios 
To achieve more general results we test the models for different, randomly generated portfo-
lios. For this reason, we implement four simulation studies. In these studies we analyze the 
                                                 
52 If we consider all 25,000 simulated portfolios from section 3.4, the lowest measured economic capital re-
quirement was even 26% lower than the regulatory capital. This result underlines the prospects of actively man-
aging credit portfolios, e.g. with credit derivatives, but this is not in the scope of this paper.  24 
accuracy for homogeneous as well as for heterogeneous portfolios with respect to PD and 
EAD. In each simulation run we generate a portfolio and determine its ES by the three mod-
els. After 100 runs we calculate the root mean squared error for the outcomes of the Pykhtin 
model and of the Cespedes models I and II
53 in absolute and relative terms to quantify its per-
formance in comparison to Monte-Carlo-Simulations using 500,000 trials. Furthermore, we 
calculate the VaR with the Basel II formula and with Monte-Carlo-Simulation to measure its 
accuracy compared to ES
mf. In the following we describe the four simulation settings. 
 
Simulation I: In this scenario we generate portfolios with homogenous exposure sizes and 
homogenous PDs, that is,  i w 1/5000    and  i PD PD const     for each credit. To test the ac-
curacy for different portfolio qualities a PD is drawn from a uniformly distribution between 
0% and 10% before each new run. The sector structure and correlation is the same as in sec-
tion 4.1. 
 
Simulation II: We generate portfolios with homogenous exposure sizes but heterogeneous 
PDs. For each sector we determine randomly one of the quality distributions from section 2.3. 
After that we draw the PD for each credit of the sector according to this quality distribution. 
The exposure size remains as in Simulation I. Again, the sector structure and correlation is 
taken from section 4.1. 
 
Simulation III: We generate portfolios with homogenous PDs as in Simulation I but with he-
terogeneous exposure sizes. Firstly, we choose the number of sectors randomly between 2 and 
11. Then we apply a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for the weight of every sector and 
scale this in order to sum up the weights to one. The weights for the credits in each sector are 
determined in the same manner. The correlations remain unchanged. 
 
Simulation IV: In this setting the PDs as well as the exposure sizes of the generated portfo-
lios are heterogeneous. The PDs are determined as in Simulation II and the exposure sizes as 
in Simulation III. 
 
                                                 
53 Cespedes I still corresponds to the DF-function based on Monte-Carlo-Simulation and Cespedes II complies 
with the DF-function based on the Pykhtin formula.  25 
In each simulation we calculate the intra-sector correlations with formula (21) and choose 
5,000 credits. These portfolios contain a relatively low amount of name concentration. Instead 
we focus on sector concentration. The reason is that the identical methodology for measuring 
name concentrations, the granularity adjustment, can be used within both approaches. Thus, 
we prefer to avoid name concentrations to be able to separately analyze the effect of sector 
concentrations. The degree of sector concentration differs between the simulations. In Simula-
tions I and II the portfolios consist of homogenous exposures leading to a CDI of 9.1% in 
each case. This equals the CDI for a naïve diversified portfolio. On the contrary in Simulation 
III and IV exposures are chosen randomly and the CDI of the generated portfolios can take 
values between 9.1%. (naïve diversification) and 1 (perfect concentration). The mean of these 
CDIs is around 30% in each simulation, which is only slightly higher than the CDIs of the 
bank portfolios analyzed by Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006), which shows that the set-
ting leads to a realistic degree of diversification.
54 The results of our simulation study can be 
found in Table 8. 
 
- Table 8 about here - 
 
Again, the outcomes of the Pykhtin model are a good approximation of the “true” result from 
the Monte-Carlo Simulations. Especially, when EADs are homogeneous the results are very 
good. Both types of the Cespedes model lead to very stable results in all simulation settings. 
Interestingly, the Cespedes model performs even better when PDs are heterogeneous, proba-
bly because the portfolios used for calculation of the functional form have heterogeneous 
PDs, too, and thus the resulting portfolios are more similar. Somewhat surprising, in Simula-
tion III the Cespedes model shows a better performance than the Pykhtin model even if the 
Pykhtin formula is used for determination of the diversification factor. Probably the approxi-
mation errors of the Pykhtin model are partially smoothed by the regression from formula 
(37).  
The comparison of the risk measures with different confidence levels shows an almost 
perfect match between ES
mf and VaR
mf. The relative error is smaller than 1% in each case. 
Thus, our simulation study clarifies that the above-mentioned theoretical problems of the non-
                                                 
54 Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) examined credit portfolios of 105 Italian banks during the period 1993-
1999. In this study, most bank portfolios had a CDI between 20% and 30%. However, it has to be considered 
that the number of different industry sectors was 23 whereas we used 11 different sectors. Thus, for a compara-
ble degree of diversification their calculated CDIs have to be slightly smaller than our CDIs.   26 
coherent VaR are not practically relevant for a very broad range of credit portfolios. Hence, 
the use of the VaR for determining the credit risk seems to be unproblematic from a practical 
point of view even if the portfolio incorporates sector concentration risk. The Basel formula, 
however, shows the largest inaccuracy of all tested models for any simulation. Since in Simu-
lation I and II a naïve diversified portfolio is taken as a basis, the Basel formula overestimates 
the risk in every case due to the diversification effect. A plot of the relative errors of the Basel 
formula and of VaR
mf in Simulation III, sorted in ascending order, can be found in Figure 5. 
Apart from slightly higher deviations, a plot with a similar characteristics results for Simula-
tion IV.  
 
- Figure 5 about here - 
 
It can be seen that for more than 50% of the simulated portfolios the Basel VaR is too low. 
That means the risk measured under Pillar 1 is underestimated compared to the “real” risk. In 
general this happens when the sector concentration of the generated portfolio increases, as al-
ready demonstrated for deterministic portfolios. Consequently, the simulation study accentu-
ates the need for considering sector concentration when calculating the risk of a credit portfo-
lio. Otherwise the risk can be massively underestimated. This conclusion coincides with that 
of BCBS (2006), which points out that sector concentration can increase the capital require-
ment up to 40%. The maximal deviation of VaR
mf is around 3%, which is negligible for prac-
tical implementation. Actually, for most of the generated portfolios the error is almost zero. In 
order to verify if there is a systematic pattern, which may help to explain the occurrence of 
these deviations in the multi-factor setting, we tried to find portfolio variables such as CDI, 
average correlation or average PD that can explain these deviations. Since our analyses did 
not show a link between the deviations and any of the mentioned variables, it seems that the 
occurrence is unsystematic  
As the purpose of deriving (semi-)analytical approximation formulas for the VaR or the 
ES is an acceleration of the computation time, we compare the runtime of the demonstrated 
methods in Table 9.
55 The main advantage of the Pykhtin model is that it can be applied with-
out an excessive calibration procedure and it is considerably faster than Monte-Carlo-
Simulations without leading to major approximation errors. When comparing both alternative 
implementations of the Cespedes model, we strongly propose to use the Pykhtin model for ca-
                                                 
55 The runtimes refer to a quad-core PC with 2.66 GHz CPUs (calculated on one core).  27 
libration (Cespedes II) instead of Monte-Carlo-Simulations (Cespedes I) as the approximation 
accuracy is almost identically but the computation time for determination of the DF-function 
is significantly lower. As this calibration procedure only has to be computed once for a speci-
fied correlation structure and the application of the formula is very fast, in most situations the 
Cespedes type model should be a very good choice. 
 
- Table 9 about here - 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a methodology to perform multi-factor models that are able to 
measure concentration risk in credit portfolios in terms of economic capital and still deliver 
results that are consistent with Basel II. Furthermore, we applied this to different multi-factor 
approaches and compared their performance. It could be shown that it is possible to achieve 
good approximations in reasonable time when the approaches are adjusted in the proposed 
way. 
We also discussed the shortcomings of the Value at Risk, which can arise when leaving 
the ASRF-framework. From a theoretical point of view, it is advisable to use a coherent risk 
measure like the ES. Since the ES, by definition, is higher than the VaR if we use the same 
confidence level, we performed a mapping procedure that determines the confidence level (z 
= 99.72%) of the ES to get reasonable results. Despite the mentioned shortcomings, however, 
the accuracy of the VaR turned out to be almost perfect compared to the ES for a multitude of 
generated portfolios. Thus, in our opinion, it is unproblematic to use the VaR for measuring 
concentration risk of credit portfolios.  
Furthermore, we chose input parameters, especially the inter- and intra-sector correla-
tions, in a way that the results are comparable with the regulatory Pillar 1 capital. Conse-
quently, we do not follow some approaches that assume a pure diversification effect com-
pared with the Basel II formula. Instead, we relate the results to a well-diversified portfolio as 
assumed when calibrating the Basel II formula and determine a function for the implied intra-
sector correlation. Hence, it is possible to directly consider the extent of credit risk concentra-
tions in the assessment of capital adequacy under Pillar 2. Using these modifications, we per-
formed an extensive numerical study similar to Cespedes et al. (2006) to get a closed form 
approximation formula. In addition, we suggest computing the multi-factor adjustment on 
bucket instead of borrower level. This allows to compute the Pykhtin formula much faster 
than Monte-Carlo-Simulations even for a high number of credits.  28 
Having assured a Basel II consistent capital requirement, we analyzed the impact of credit 
concentration risk and carried out a simulation study to compare the performance of the (mod-
ified) models from Cespedes et al. (2006) and Pykhtin (2004). We detect that the Pykhtin 
model leads to very good results for homogeneous as well as heterogeneous PDs when EADs 
are homogeneous. The performance is slightly lower for heterogeneous EADs. The results of 
the Cespedes model have a throughout high accuracy. Interestingly, the approach works better 
for heterogeneous portfolios. In general, both models can be used for approximating the eco-
nomic capital in a multi-factor setting when adjusted in the proposed way. The main advan-
tage of the Pykhtin model is that it can be directly applied to an arbitrary portfolio type, whe-
reas the approach of Cespedes et al. (2006) should not be used without initially performing 
the demonstrated extensive numerical work when the portfolio structure is very different. On 
the contrary, the results of the Cespedes model were slightly better for heterogeneous portfo-
lios and it allows for ad-hoc analyses including sensitivity analyses when the non-recurring 
extensive numerical work is progressed. 
In further analyses it would be interesting to analyze the approach of Cespedes et al. 
(2006) when adjusted to a specific bank portfolio. Under the (plausible) assumption that a 
bank’s portfolio will only be faced to minor changes for a finite period, it should be possible 
to get a higher accuracy for this bandwidth of scenarios. Moreover, it would be helpful to 
know how much numerical work is necessary when the parameters are highly restricted to 
these realistic cases to achieve stable results because the extensive computation time is still a 
challenge. 
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Appendix A.1 
To relate L   to L   the systematic factor x   is defined as 
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with  i,k s,k D  D and  is xx     for obligor i in sector s.  
Since there is no unique method to determine the coefficients  k {b }, we use the approach 
presented by Pykhtin (2004). Thus, the coefficients are chosen in a way that the correlation 
between x   and {x  } will be maximized, in order to minimize the difference given by (24) be-
tween the quantiles  z q( L )   and  z q( L )  . This leads to the following maximization problem: 
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The solutions of  k {b } are given as 
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where the Lagrange multiplier O is chosen so that { k b } satisfy the constraint. There is no ob-
vious choice of the weighting factors  i d  but 
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leads to good results, which is the VaR formula in a single factor model. The intuition behind 
this choice is that obligors with a high exposure in terms of VaR should get a high weight in 
the maximization problem. 
 
Appendix A.2 
The derivatives of (23) are calculated as follows: 
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The derivatives  i p( x )    and  i p( x )    of the conditional default probability are calculated by diffe-
rentiation of equation (6) as 
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Since L   is deterministic for given x  , v(x  ) equals the conditional variance of L  , this means 
v(x) var(L L|x) var(L|x).         To calculate v(x  ) the conditional variance can be decom-
posed as the sum of systematic and idiosyncratic parts: 
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The first summand v( x )    of (A.9) can be calculated as 
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where 
x
ij U
  describes the conditional asset correlation 
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The first derivative of v( x )    is given by: 
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The second summand  GA v( x )   of (A.9) and its derivative  GA v( x )    are 
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 I 
FIGURE 1 Accuracy of the Pillar 1 capital requirements considering risk concentra-
tions 
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FIGURE 2 Portfolio quality distributions 
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FIGURE 3 Diversification Factor realizations on the basis of 50,000 simulations 
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FIGURE 4 Surface plot of the DF-function 
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FIGURE 5 Deviations of VaR
Basel and VaR
mf from ES
mf
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TABLE 1 Confidence levels for the ES implying 
Basel
z ES  to be matched with the  
VaR
Basel for portfolios of different quality 
 
  Portfolio Type / Quality  VaR
Basel & 
Basel
z ES   Confidence Level z(ES) 
(I) AAA only  0.57%  99.672% 
(II) Very High  6,12%  99.709% 
(III) High  7.59%  99.711% 
(IV) Average  12.94%  99.719% 
(V) Low  20.89%  99.726% 
(VI) Very Low  23.30%  99.727% 
(VII) CCC only  57.00%  99.741% 
 
   F IGURES AND TABLES   
 VII 
TABLE 2 Inter-sector correlation structure based on MSCI industry indices (in %) 
 a 
Sector  A  B  C1 C2 C3  D  E  F  H  I  J 
A:  Energy  100  50 42 34 45 46 57 34 10 31 69 
B:  Materials    100 87 61 75 84 62 30 56 73 66 
C1:  Capital  Goods      100 67 83 92 65 32 69 82 66 
C2: Comm. Svs. & Supplies        100 58  68  40  8  50  60  37 
C3:  Transportation       100 83  68  27  58  77  67 
D:  Consumer  Discretionary        100 76  21  69  81  66 
E:  Consumer  Staples         100 33  46  56  66 
F:  Health  Care          100  15  24  46 
H:  Information  Technology           100  75  42 
I:  Telecommunication  Services            100 62 
J:  Utilities             100
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 VIII 
TABLE 3 Overall sector composition of the German banking system  
Sector  Exposure Weight 
A: Energy  0.18% 
B: Materials  6.01% 
C1: Capital Goods  11.53% 
C2: Comm. Svs. & Supplies  33.69% 
C3: Transportation  7.14% 
D: Consumer Discretionary  14.97% 
E: Consumer Staples  6.48% 
F: Health Care  9.09% 
H: Information Technology  3.20% 
I: Telecommunication Services 1.04% 
J: Utilities  6.67% 
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TABLE 4 Implicit intra-sector correlations for different portfolio quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portfolio Type / Quality Implicit Intra-Sector Correlation 
(I) Very High  30% 
(II) High  28% 
(III) Average  25% 
(IV) Low  23% 
(V) Very Low  21% 
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TABLE 5 Comparison of the models for the 5 benchmark portfolios with absolute er-
ror in basis points (bp) and relative error in percent (%) 
 
 
  Portfolio 
1 
Portfolio 
2 
Portfolio 
3 
Portfolio  
4 
Portfolio 
5 
MC-Sim. 
ES 6.23%  7.68%  12.95%  20.88%  23.15% 
VaR 6.18%  7.62%  12.94%  20.93%  23.3% 
Absolute Error  -5 bp  -6 bp  -1 bp  5 bp  15 bp 
Relative  Error -0.80%  -0.78% 0.08% 0.24% 0.65% 
Basel II 
VaR 6.12%  7.59%  12.95%  20.89%  23.26% 
Absolute Error  -11 bp  -9 bp  0 bp  1 bp  11 bp 
Relative  Error -1.77%  -1.17% 0.00% 0.05% 0.48% 
Pykhtin 
ES 6.21%  7.66%  12.91%  20.80%  23.20% 
Absolute Error  -2 bp  -2 bp  -4 bp  -8 bp  5 bp 
Relative  Error  -0.32% -0.26% -0.31% -0.38% 0.22% 
Cespedes I 
ES 6.07%  7.51%  12.70%  20.43%  22.79% 
Absolute Error  -16 bp  -17 bp  -25 bp  -45 bp  -36 bp 
Relative  Error  -2.57% -2.21% -1.93% -2.16% -1.56% 
Cespedes II 
ES 6.00%  7.45%  12.68%  20.48%  22.87% 
Absolute Error  -23 bp  -23 bp  -27 bp  -40 bp  -28 bp 
Relative  Error  -3.69% -2.99% -2.08% -1.92% -1.21% 
a 
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TABLE 6 Comparison of the models for 5 high concentrated portfolios with absolute  
error in basis points (bp) and relative error in percent (%) 
  Portfolio 
1 
Portfolio 
2 
Portfolio 
3 
Portfolio  
4 
Portfolio 
5 
MC-Sim. 
ES  7.69%  9.22%  15.41% 24.41% 27.10% 
VaR  7.48%  9.17%  15.36% 24.51% 27.06% 
Absolute Error  -21 bp  -5 bp  -5 bp  10 bp  -6 bp 
Relative  Error  -2.73% -0.54% -0.32% 0.41%  0.15% 
Basel II 
VaR  6.12%  7.59%  12.95% 20.89% 23.26% 
Absolute Error  -157 bp  -163 bp  -246 bp  -352 bp  -384 bp 
Relative  Error -20.42% -17.68% -15.96% -14.42% -14.17% 
Pykhtin 
ES  7.66%  9.29%  15.46% 24.39% 27.03% 
Absolute Error  -3 bp  7 bp  5 bp  -2 bp  -7 bp 
Relative Error  -0.35%  0.76%  0.31%  -0.08%  -0.24% 
Cespedes I 
ES  7.40%  9.08%  15.59% 25.07% 27.95% 
Absolute Error  -29 bp  -14 bp  18 bp  66 bp  85 bp 
Relative  Error  -3.77% 1.52% 1.17% 2.70% 3.14% 
Cespedes II 
ES  7.22%  8.86%  15.19% 24.38% 27.14% 
Absolute Error  -47 bp  -36 bp  -22 bp  -3 bp  4 bp 
Relative  Error  -6.11% -3.90% -1.43% -0.12% 0.15% 
a 
 
   F IGURES AND TABLES   
 XII 
TABLE 7 Comparison of the models for 5 low concentrated portfolios with absolute  
error in basis points (bp) and relative error in percent (%) 
 
 
  Portfolio 
1 
Portfolio 
2 
Portfolio 
3 
Portfolio  
4 
Portfolio 
5 
MC-Sim. 
ES  5.66%  6.98%  12.16% 19.78% 22.06% 
VaR  5.64%  6.94%  12.17% 19.81% 22.10% 
Absolute Error  -2 bp  -4 bp  1 bp  3 bp  4 bp 
Relative  Error  -0.35%  -0.57% 0.08% 0.15% 0.18% 
Basel II 
VaR  6.12%  7.59%  12.95% 20.89% 23.26% 
Absolute Error  46 bp  61 bp  79 bp  111 bp  120 bp 
Relative  Error  8.13% 8.74% 6.50% 5.61% 5.44% 
Pykhtin 
ES  5.67%  6.98%  12.14% 19.74% 22.08% 
Absolute Error  1 bp  0 bp  -2 bp  -4 bp  2 bp 
Relative  Error 0.26% -0.07% -0.16% -0.21% 0.09% 
Cespedes I 
ES  5.66%  6.94%  11.92% 19.17% 21.38% 
Absolute Error  0 bp  -4 bp  -24 bp  -61 bp  -68 bp 
Relative  Error 0.0%  -0.57% -1.97% -3.08% -3.08% 
Cespedes II 
ES  5.64%  6.94%  12.06% 19.52% 21.81% 
Absolute Error  -2 bp  -4 bp  -10 bp  -26 bp  -25 bp 
Relative  Error  -0.35% -0.57% -0.82% -1.31% -1.13% 
a 
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TABLE 8 Comparison of the models resulting from simulation studies  
with different parameter settings 
 
  Simulation
I 
Simulation
II 
Simulation 
III 
Simulation
IV 
MC-Sim. VaR 
Ø Absolute Error  18 bp  6 bp  22 bp  8 bp 
Ø  Relative  Error  0.67% 0.43% 0.77% 0.60% 
Basel II 
Ø Absolute Error  259 bp  186 bp  264 bp  379 bp 
Ø  Relative  Error  11.66%  13.70% 8.81% 25.76% 
Pykhtin 
Ø Absolute Error  14 bp  11 bp  54 bp  18 bp 
Ø  Relative  Error  0.64% 0.81% 3.40% 1.26% 
Cespedes I 
Ø Absolute Error  54 bp  11 bp  47 bp  20 bp 
Ø  Relative  Error  1.73% 0.79% 1.65% 1.53% 
Cespedes II 
Ø Absolute Error  54 bp  12 bp  46 bp  21 bp 
Ø  Relative  Error  1.72% 0.84% 1.56% 1.59% 
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TABLE 9 Comparison of the runtime 
 
  Runtime: Calibration  Runtime: Application 
MC-Simulation    20 min 
Pykhtin    ~ 10 sec - 2 min 
Cespedes I  30 days  0.01 sec 
Cespedes II  150 min  0.01 sec 
 
 